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One Song, Many Works: A Pluralist Ontology of Rock
  Dan Burkett 
Abstract
A number of attempts have been made to construct a plausible
ontology of rock music.  Each of these ontologies identifies a single
type of ontological entity as the “work” in rock music.  Yet, all the
suggestions advanced to date fail to capture some important
considerations about how we engage with music of this tradition. This
prompted Lee Brown to advocate a healthy skepticism of higher-order
musical ontologies.  I argue here that we should instead embrace a
pluralist ontology of rock, an ontology that recognizes more than one
kind of entity as “the work” in rock music. I contend that this approach
has a number of advantages over other ontologies of rock, including
that of allowing us to make some comparisons across ontological kinds.
Key Words
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1.  Introduction
Painters create paintings, sculptors create sculptures, and
photographers create photographic prints.  What, then, are the art
works of rock musicians?[1]  The Beatles created songs, tracks,
concerts, and albums, but which of these should we consider to be their
“works”?  Stephen Davies[2] argues that a work of rock music is a
song-for-studio-performance, while Theodore Gracyk[3] and Andrew
Kania[4] both identify the recorded track as the work.  Each of these
positions is found wanting, however, as none of them successfully
accounts for the way in which we engage with music in the rock
tradition.
This difficulty in identifying the work of music is specific to the rock
genre and stems from the unique importance placed upon the recorded
track in the rock tradition.  This is especially evident when it is
compared with the contrasting genres of classical music and jazz. In
classical music, the work of the classical musician (the composer) that
forms the central focus of critical attention tends to be the
composition[5] (more on this in section 1).  
Conversely, the work of the jazz musician which forms the central
focus of critical attention tends to be the performance.  While classical
and jazz music may both be recorded, the role of this activity is far less
important than the activities of composition and performance in each
of these respective genres.  Classical and jazz recordings are not
usually intended to be works in their own right but are a way in which
performances of music from these traditions can be more easily
disseminated.  This contrasts strongly with the rock tradition, where a
track is often intended to be a work in and of itself and commonly
contains features not found in the song or performance (more on this
in section 3).
Lee Brown denies the plausibility of an ontology of rock and advocates
for a healthy skepticism of ontologies devoted to specific forms of
music (what he calls “higher-order music ontologies”).  I think it is too
soon to reach this conclusion.  Because current ontologies of rock focus
on one kind of entity as “the work” and not on all the entities that rock
music produces, it does not thereby mean that we ought to abandon
higher-order ontologies altogether. My solution is to embrace a
pluralist ontology of rock, an ontology that recognizes more than one
kind of activity or entity as a work of rock music.
Why should we be concerned with establishing what the musical works
are in the rock tradition?  The motivation behind this inquiry is two-
fold: first, we judge artists by the works they create; thus to judge
rock musicians, we need to identify what their works are.  Do we, for
example, judge rock musicians by assessing the songs they write, the
tracks they record, the performances they give, or something else
entirely?  
The question is far from trivial.  While some rock musicians may
engage in and excel at all of these activities, many others have their
specializations.  Who is the better rock musician, the artist who creates
exquisite tracks yet delivers atrocious live performances, or the artist
whose recordings are mediocre but whose live shows are like no other?
 A question like this cannot be answered until we establish which, if
any, of these entities is considered a work in rock music.  Second, once
we have established what we should assess, we need to establish how
we should assess it.  Kania has suggested that one of the reasons that
rock music “is held in lower esteem by some” may be because its art
works “have been misunderstood to be of the same kind as classical
musical works.”[6]  Are rock works possibly entirely different from
musical works of other genres?  In that case our traditional methods of
aesthetic assessment (i.e., those that we bring to bear on works of
classical music or jazz) may be wholly inadequate.
2.  The ontology of music generally
I begin this discussion with a consideration of the ontology of music
generally.  Kania notes that in classical music the production of the
sound event for an audience is the result of two “quite distinct groups
of actions.”[7]  The first is the composer creating the musical work by
writing a score, and is followed by the performing artist/s performing
the work.  This claim runs counter to Platonic realism, according to
which musical works are universals.[8]  On the Platonic view, a work
such as the 1812 Overture has always existed, and thus was not
created but merely discovered by Tchaikovsky.  Kania’s claim instead
seems to echo a nominalist position, such as that put forward by
Nelson Goodman.[9]  On this view, “the distinguishing feature of a
work lies not in there being some abstract entity existing apart from its
performances and score-copies, but in there being for each work a
special kind of score.”[10]  This approach holds that a classical
composer creates the musical work by writing the score.  For
Goodman, “the constitutive properties demanded of a performance of
[the musical work] are those prescribed in the score,”[11] and whether
or not a performance is a performance of a particular musical work will
depend upon whether it “has or has not all the constitutive properties
of [that] work.”[12]
This traditional ontology of music fails to describe rock music for two
reasons:  first, many rock songs have no score.  They are fluid
creations born of improvisation and collaboration and are rarely
transcribed in any detail.  If this is the case, how are we to establish
when a performance is a performance of a particular work of rock
music?  Where are we to find the constitutive properties of the work?
Second, even where a score is created, it is not necessary for a
performance of a musical work of rock to have all (or even many) of
the constitutive properties outlined in that score.  Rage Against the
Machine's cover of Bruce Springsteen's "The Ghost of Tom Joad"
utilizes a completely different melody from the original.  Likewise,
Hilary Duff’s cover of Depeche Mode’s “Personal Jesus” features
entirely new lyrics and even a new title, “Reach Out.”[13]  Despite
these differences, in both cases fans clearly identify the artists as
performing the same rock songs.
Kania registers strong disagreement with the “unintuitively stringent”
requirements of Goodman’s wider view.[14]  Jonathan Neufeld shares
this concern, noting that Goodman’s account of performance is
“conceptually consistent but overly rigid.”[15]  For Neufeld, it is not
clear “that judgments concerning the identity of the performance…do
not bleed straight away into aesthetic judgments”—that is, that “the
supposedly non-aesthetic, non-normative commitment to certain
identity criteria of performance…is in itself aesthetic.”[16]  It is this
observation which leads Neufeld to argue that “ontological constraints
on musical performance should be embraced, if at all, as normative
claims from within the musical public sphere rather than as
metaphysical constraints imposed from without.”[17]  In this way,
claims about musical ontology—about what counts as a musical
“work”—should be treated as claims that are critical, not metaphysical.
Neufeld, then, wants to defend the possibility of allowing “the diverse
members of music practice” to determine musical ontology.[18]  It is
this very sentiment that underpins my current inquiry.  The reason that
the traditional ontology of music fails to describe rock music is that it
does not fit with the way that members of the practice (that is, rock
musicians, rock critics, and rock fans) ordinarily engage with works
from that tradition.  In what follows, I will survey and assess several
competing ontologies of rock (including my own) against this standard.
3.  Competing ontologies of rock
Gracyk holds that in rock “the musical work is less typically a song than
an arrangement of recorded sounds.”[19]  In this view, works of rock
music are not ontologically “thin” songs to be instantiated in different
performances but rather ontologically “thick” structures recorded as
audio tracks and properly instanced through the playback of that
recording.[20]  Gracyk’s ontology of rock can be presented
diagrammatically as follows:
 
Songs are “thin” in that they carry all of the necessary elements for the
literal instantiation of a particular musical work (such as who plays
what, when, in what key, and at what tempo).  Tracks, on the other
hand, are maximally “thick” in that they contain many more nuances
than a score could ever provide.  While a correct instantiation of
Beethoven’s “Für Elise” would  require adhering to the constitutive
properties outlined in the score (as in the nominalist view of
Goodman), a correct instantiation of the Rolling Stones’ track “Gimme
Shelter” would require an exact replication of all elements of the
original recording—right down to Merry Clayton’s voice breaking at
three-minutes-four-seconds into the song.
In the track-centered view, rock music “is essentially dependent on
recording technology for its inception and dissemination.”[21]  Davies
disagrees with this interpretation, noting that “more groups play rock
music than ever are recorded.”[22]  According to the track-centered
ontology, such bands have not created any works of rock music.  Let
us call this the “no-works problem.”  A parallel problem concerns the
status of rock songs that have not yet been recorded as tracks.  In the
2011 documentary Back and Forth, Dave Grohl, lead singer of the Foo
Fighters, describes how the song “Enough Space” was written and
introduced into the band’s repertoire mid-tour to cater to the European
mosh pits.  The song became the Foo Fighter’s concert opener and was
performed live for many months before being recorded.  Much energy
and experimentation were spent on the song’s conception, and it
subsequently became a focus of critical attention by fans and
commentators alike.  Despite this, a track-centered ontology would
hold that until the song was recorded it failed to qualify as a work of
rock music by the Foo Fighters.  This seems wrong.
Davies attempts to provide an ontology of rock that better addresses
these issues.  He argues that, as in the case of classical music, works
of rock music are songs created for performance.  There is a distinction
however. While classical works are created for live performance, rock
works are created for studio performance.[23] Davies’s ontology of
rock can be represented as follows:
 
In Davies’s ontology, unrecorded songs like “Enough Space” will be
considered works so long as they are created with the intention of
eventually being performed in the recording studio.  (This intention is
implicit in the “for” of “for-studio-performance.”)  This ontology, too,
still suffers from the “no-works problem.”  Davies merely replaces
Gracyk’s reliance on recording with a reliance on the intention to
perform a song in the studio at some point.  In highlighting this
problem, Kania notes that works-for-studio-performance seem to
necessarily require a sound-engineer.  But, he continues:
[a]lthough many garage and pub bands may hope to be
recorded one day, it is not clear that they write their
songs with a part for a sound engineer even implicitly in
mind....[T]hese bands seem to think they are providing
audiences with fully authentic performances of their
songs, not with performances missing a part. [24]
Indeed, many bands write rock songs without any intention of one day
performing them in a studio.  In the works-for-studio-performance
ontology, however, these songs would not be considered works of rock
music.
Kania’s own ontology of rock attempts to join Gracyk’s idea “that the
primary work in rock music is the ontologically thick recording”[25]
with Davies’s notion that “rock is importantly a performance art.”[26]
Kania argues that “rock musicians primarily construct tracks.  These
are ontologically thick works... and are at the center of rock as an art
form.”[27]  According to Kania, these tracks manifest songs without
being performances of them.[28]  Kania’s ontology holds that a song is
an ontologically thin structure of “melody, harmony and lyrics,”[29]
and despite the central importance of tracks, such songs may also be
manifested in live performances.  Put simply, songs are a sort of basic
framework that may be instantiated later as either an audio track or a
live performance.  It is only tracks however, not performances, that are
legitimate musical works.  Kania’s more complicated ontology of rock
can be represented as follows:
As Kania notes, the term “manifestation” is used in order to provide an
intermediate between something authentically instantiating a work (or
nonwork object, such as a rock song) and bearing no relation to that
work.  A manifestation “represents the work [or nonwork object],
displaying many of its properties, without necessarily being an instance
of it,”[30] something which both the recorded track and the live
performance do.  Note that Kania’s privileging of tracks as the musical
“work ” of rock does not necessarily entail that songs and
performances receive no critical attention.  Instead, the track-centered
ontology is best understood as implying that while songs and
performances may receive some critical attention, they are not the
primary focus of critical attention in the rock tradition.  
Unfortunately, the revised track-centered ontology falls prey to the
very same criticisms as Gracyk’s original track-centered ontology.  The
“no-works problem” rears its head again, as do the concerns about the
status of rock songs that have not been codified as tracks.
4.  Brown’s skepticism and a pluralist ontology of rock
The challenge of identifying the work in specific musical traditions has
led to Lee Brown’s skepticism about higher-order musical ontologies
altogether.[31]  He observes that the ontologies of rock outlined above
all attempt to provide an answer to the question, “Is the work of rock
music a track?  Or, is it a song?”[32]  Brown seems sympathetic to
Gracyk’s and Kania’s views that the track is the primary focus of 
critical attention when discussing rock music,[33] but he notes that
“we can and do bring as much critical discourse to bear on rock songs
as on rock tracks.”[34]  For this reason he argues that “it is
unconvincing to privilege tracks ontologically over songs. But it would
be equally unconvincing to privilege rock songs over rock tracks….”[35]
The central problem is that regarding neither the song nor the track as
the work in rock music provides a full and satisfactory explanation for
the way in which we engage with music in the rock tradition.  As Brown
points out, once “we begin to choose one position over others, we have
already taken the bait.”[36]  He believes that answering the question,
“What is the work in rock music?” already presupposes “that there
exists an entrenched concept of the work of rock music.”[37]  Brown
argues that the most plausible position is therefore to deny the
existence of any such concept as the work. 
I believe that such skepticism about the existence of a single work in
rock music should not lead to a more general skepticism about works
of rock music.  Instead, I contend, it should give us reason to embrace
an ontology of rock that allows for a plurality of ontologically diverse
works.  Why doesn’t Brown’s line of reasoning lead him to consider
such a pluralism?  The most likely explanation is that it is precluded by
the second basis of his skepticism—namely, that the very concept of a
“work” of rock music is an “artefact of philosophy.”[38]  He argues that
works of rock music “play no role in musical discourse” and can only be
known as “inventions of the philosophers who conjure with them.”[39]
 But this does not seem quite right.  “Works” are simply those things
that the artist creates and upon which we focus some amount of critical
attention.  (Just how much critical attention will be discussed later.)  To
talk of works of rock music is merely to talk of those things in the rock
tradition that meet this description.
The possibility of a pluralist ontology of rock seems to be a position
with which Kania tacitly agrees.  He states that if our critical attention
was split amongst several kinds of ontologically varied objects in a
musical tradition, “then the correct conclusion to draw would...be that
there are two primary foci of critical attention in the given
tradition.”[40]  I take this proposal further.  A correct ontology of rock
will include three primary foci of attention:  rock songs, rock tracks,
and rock performances.  Consider how rock works are created.  The
initial work created by a rock musician is the ontologically thin song.
 This song includes a number of basic features, the presence of some
number of which will be sufficient to provide the bases for a
manifestation of that song.  A lack of a sufficient number of these
features will not indicate a bad manifestation of a song but rather a
failure to manifest that song at all.
A rock song can be manifested as either a track or a performance, and
can be manifested in the same way any number of times (so there can
be many different tracks and many different performances of the same
song).  Both tracks and performances are also works of rock music.
 The song “The Ghost of Tom Joad” is a work of rock music and so too
are the tracks of the same name by Bruce Springsteen and Rage
Against the Machine, as well as any live performances of that same
song.  This ontology can be represented as follows:
 Whereas Gracyk, Davies, and Kania all select one kind of thing as the
work, I contend that an ontology that embraces songs as works and
tracks as works and performances as works best reflects the way we
engage with rock music.  Pluralist ontologies are a common feature of
newer art forms.  Consider, for example, works of computer art.
Dominic Lopes defends an ontologically pluralist account of computer
art in which works of computer art create displays that can then be
considered works in their own right.[41]
The argument for the track as a work of rock music is well established.
 This is the thesis underpinning both Gracyk’s and Kania’s positions,
and has been touted by Franklin Bruno as the “emerging consensus
about the ontology of rock.”[42]  What is more controversial is the
assertion that songs and performances should also be afforded the
status of works.  Of these two types of entities, songs in particular
receive short shrift.  Davies states that “very thin works, such as
songs…are usually not of much interest in themselves…[and that] as
pieces become thicker, they become more worthy of interest.”[43]
 Kania concurs, holding that rock songs are not “the, or even a,
primary focus of critical attention in rock” and that for this reason they
are not musical works.[44]  This move from a lack-of-critical-attention
to a lack-of-work-status is based in Kania’s own definition of a work of
art, according to which “a work of art is an art object that (1) is of a
kind that is a primary focus of critical attention in a given art form or
tradition, and (2) is a persisting object.”[45]
5.  Songs as works
Is it really the case that rock songs fail to be a primary focus of critical
attention?  Brown, as noted above, believes that songs clearly receive
at least some critical attention.  He argues that in the rock tradition:
…we can critically compare tracks considered as tracks—
Rolling Stones tracks with those of the Beatles, say. But
we can also compare songs—by John Lennon and Paul
McCartney, say—with those of Mick Jagger and Keith
Richards.[46]
Furthermore, we can coherently discuss and evaluate rock songs
without relying on features of their best-known manifestations.[47] I
can coherently discuss and evaluate the song “Hallelujah” without
referring to the tracks recorded by either Leonard Cohen or Jeff
Buckley, or to any particular live performance.  I might refer to the
song’s skillful chord progression or to the surprising lyrics of the
second verse.
Bruno agrees that songs are of central importance to the rock tradition.
 He observes “the relevance of songs and songwriting to the making,
appreciation, and evaluation of rock music”[48] and notes that a
number of rock musicians “are frequently credited with excellence or
merit as songwriters by listeners and practitioners.”[49] He argues that
the existence of such judgments “indicates that songs are, on some
occasions, a focus of attention for those who appreciate and evaluate
rock music.”[50]  Bruno further supports the argument for the
importance of rocks songs by pointing to the way in which “evaluations
of rock music often appeal to the relationship between a song and its
realization in a particular rendition.”[51]  We might, for example, make
the claim that a particular track is “over-produced,” or “under-
produced.”  As Bruno notes, “there is nothing incoherent about
preferring, on balance, an indifferently produced recording of what one
judges to be a good song to a well-produced recording of a bad or
pedestrian one.”[52]  Such a view would, however, be incoherent if it
were only recorded tracks that were worthy of critical attention.
Like Brown, Bruno is convinced that “songs are legitimate objects of
artistic interest and attention within rock practice.”[53]  In discussing
the allegedly “uninteresting” nature of rock songs, Bruno considers
that:
it is unclear why a philosopher’s judgment about these
matters should override paradigmatic evidence that
audiences and musicians treat songs as objects of critical
and evaluative interest, especially in the context of an
avowedly descriptive metaphysical project.[54]
As the track-centered ontologist alleges, the rock track may be the
primary focus of critical attention and thus deserving of work-status,
but shouldn’t the substantial attention that songs also receive qualify
them, too, as worthy of work-status?  The primary focus of critical
attention for an architect may be the building she designs, but we also
treat her conceptual designs and sketches as works in their own right.
 I contend that the same criteria should apply in the rock tradition.
 Brown appears sympathetic to this position:
Suppose it could be shown that rock tracks get roughly
seventy per cent of the critical attention devoted to rock
music, with only thirty per cent devoted to songs.  Not
even this unbalanced mix would warrant the strange
conclusion that the rock work is a track, not a song.[55]
Both rock songs and tracks receive critical attention, and both should
be considered works of rock music on their own merits.  As a result a
pluralist ontology of rock is both logical and inevitable.
6.  Performances as works
What about live performances?  I earlier expressed my belief that they
are works of rock music, as well.  I structure my argument to accept
live performances in much the same way as my earlier argument for
songs, namely by examining the manner in which audiences and
musicians treat performances.  As with songs, we give much critical
attention to live performances, distinguishing, for example, between
“beautiful renditions” and “lackluster recitals.” Comparisons are also
commonly made between live performances.  If the argument for
pluralism succeeds and work status is given to any musical rock entity
that is a focus of critical attention, I believe that live performances are
equally deserving of such status as songs.
That rock performances receive critical attention is not the issue here;
the real hurdle for live performances being afforded work status is that
if they are not recorded, they are not enduring entities, a quality that
Kania’s definition of a work requires.  A valid pluralism of rock music,
however, does not depend on live performances being afforded the
status of works.  For the present we will simply have a limited
pluralism in which only rock tracks and rock songs will be identified as
works of rock music.
A pluralist ontology of rock has a number of advantages over other
ontologies of rock.  First, a pluralist ontology uniquely recognizes that
our critical attention is focused on rock songs and rock tracks and rock
performances, as opposed to only one of these.  This approach avoids
the major pitfall of track-centered ontologies, which require that a
band must record a song before it has created a work of rock music.  A
pluralist ontology acknowledges that a rock band has created a work
upon completing the writing of a song.[56]  The band then creates
additional works of rock music when it performs this song live.  This
ontological change addresses a similar problem with Davies’s works-
for-studio-performance ontology that a band need not intend to record
songs to create works of rock music.
7.  Comparisons among different works of rock music
As with any other art form, we compare works of rock music of the
same ontological kind.  We compare songs with songs, tracks with
tracks, and performances with performances.  The pluralist ontology
may also allow us to evaluate works of rock music of different
ontological kinds, for example tracks with performances, so long as
those works instance the same song.  Such comparisons are common
in our everyday dealings with rock music.  I might praise Pearl Jam’s
track “Jeremy,” but in my criticism write that “the live performance
from their concert last week was so much better.”
Kania is resistant to such a possibility, arguing that there is an
important metaphysical difference between tracks and performances
that should prevent us from making comparisons between the two.[57]
 This difference arises from the fact that with studio recordings, one
can “always in principle go back and change something until one is
happy with the result,”[58] something that cannot be done when
performing live.  In addition, while bands often employ similar
instrumentation in live performances, they don’t usually attempt to
create a “sonic doppelgänger”[59] of the original recording.  Instead,
bands make use of techniques such as “extended introduction[s]...
alternative lyrics... interpolated verses; improvisatory instrumental
breaks; and...extended coda[s]”[60] to provide different instantiations
of the same song.
Kania appears to be claiming that unless two works are of a
metaphysically identical type, they cannot be fairly compared.  This
seems an overly strict requirement for the practice of comparison.[61]
 While there are important ontological and metaphysical differences
between recorded tracks and live performances, this should not
preclude us from making at least some comparisons across those
ontological divides.  Henry Pratt, for one, argues that “we can in
principle compare artworks that derive their value from different sets of
properties.”[62]  This should come as no surprise.  We often compare
all sorts of ontologically different kinds of works.  We prefer a Royal
Shakespeare Company’s performance of Hamlet to Kenneth Branagh’s
film adaptation of the same play, or the BBC miniseries Pride and
Prejudice to the 2005 film of the same name. Such cross-ontological-
kind comparisons are possible because the different works share a
causal ancestry:  They are performances or interpretations of the same
text.  Tracks and performances which are instantiations of the same
song are no different.  In the case of rock music, our ability to compare
tracks and performances also stems from the works’ shared causal
ancestry:  Different instantiations of the same song all possess a
sufficient number of features in common.
8.  Some potential objections to a pluralist ontology of rock
One important objection to ontological pluralism about rock music goes
as follows:  When  using the expression “the musical work ‘Eleanor
Rigby,’ ” we are understood to be referring to a single, unique entity
(that is, the musical work “Eleanor Rigby”).  However, if ontological
pluralism is adopted, there is no single entity that is the musical work
“Eleanor Rigby.”  Instead, there are many different entities,[63] each
of which is a musical work appropriately referred to as “Eleanor Rigby.”
 Thus the sentence “the musical work ‘Eleanor Rigby’ was created by
The Beatles” is not true.[64]
If the expression “the musical work ‘Eleanor Rigby’” can only apply to a
single work, it is not the fault of ontological pluralism, but rather
because the phrase itself is ambiguous.  When I say that my mother
enjoys Pride and Prejudice, I could be referring to the novel, the film,
or the televised miniseries.  Ontological pluralism allows for a
multiplicity of works to use this name; therefore, when we use the
expression “the musical work ‘Eleanor Rigby,’” we should not be
understood to be referring to a single, unique entity.
A further objection is that if ontological pluralism is accepted, both
tracks and live performances will be recognized as musical works, and
instance other musical works (namely, songs).  Therefore each time we
listen to a track or live performance, we actually listen to two musical
works—the track or performance and the song that it manifests.
 Davies considers the possibility that “a rock recording presents more
than one work of art:  an electronic piece that is replete with
constitutive properties and…a realization of a much thinner song.”[65]
 Nonetheless, he rejects this on the possibility that “very thin works,
such as songs…are usually not of much interest in themselves.”[66]
 My intention has been to successfully disprove this allegation of the
“uninterestingness” of rock songs.  I have argued above that we, at
least sometimes, find rock songs interesting and bring critical attention
to bear on them.  There seems to be implicit support from Davies that
if songs are interesting, there is nothing very problematic about rock
tracks and live performances simultaneously presenting us with an
experience of two different musical works.  Bruno agrees, stating that:
Some rock recordings, including many too canonical to
dismiss, afford listeners access to two objects of potential
artistic interest:  that is, two works.  One is the recording
itself (or, perhaps, the sound-event-type instanced on
playback).  The other is the song of which it is a rendition.
 Listeners make and articulate appreciative, critical, and
evaluative judgments about works of both kinds.[67]
Given ontological pluralism, it is possible to experience more than one
work simultaneously; this occurs in many art forms.  When I watch a
film adaptation of Macbeth I also experience two works, the director’s
film and the bard’s original play, and there does not appear to be
anything particularly controversial about such a claim.
If a compelling case has been put forward for a pluralist ontology of
rock, an ontology of rock that allows for more than one kind of entity
to be a work of rock music, one objection remains.  I have here
argued here for three kinds of entities as musical  works of rock on the
basis that each receives critical attention in the rock tradition. But what
stops us at these three?  If the criterion for something being a work of
rock music is that it receives critical attention, then surely there are
other entities that might qualify as works of rock.
A pluralist ontology is supposed to provide a third alternative to having
either a single work of rock music (as Gracyk’s, Davies’s, and Kania’s
ontologies do) or no work of rock music (as Brown’s ontology does).
 Any ontology must provide an acceptable explanation for which
entities or things we consider as works of rock music.  This is not
complicated to decide if we accept that there is only one kind of thing
that is the work in rock music and that it is that entity which is the
primary focus of critical attention.  We simply pick that thing upon
which we focus our critical attention.  A pluralist ontology is more
challenging and, if we are not discerning about the lines we draw, we
may find ourselves descending a slippery slope towards
“megapluralism.”[68]
There are two ways in which this descent might occur.  First, one could
begin to treat components of works as works in themselves. We might,
for example, consider a particular verse of a song to be a work of rock
music.  We might then go further, insisting that a particular line should
receive this same status, and so on towards a reductio.  The simplest
way to avoid this is to restrict ourselves to being pluralist about works
of different kinds, but not pluralist about different parts of the same
work.  We cannot, simply put, divide an already identified work into
additional separate works.
The status of rock albums provides an example for this division
dilemma.  Rock fans often bring critical attention to bear on both
albums (e.g., Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band) and the songs on
them (e.g., “Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds”).   Applying the pluralism
I have presented, it is sufficient for albums to be afforded work status.
 The division restriction, however, would preclude us from counting
tracks as works, because tracks are a division of albums.
The pluralist might respond to this problem by claiming that when
evaluating albums, rock fans are not bringing critical attention to bear
on the album as a work in itself but rather as a collection of other
works.  Consider an analogy with paintings.  I may say that “the Monet
exhibition at the museum is truly inspiring,” but this does not mean
that I am bringing critical attention to bear on the exhibition as a work
in itself.  Instead, my utterance is shorthand for a bundle of judgments
I have made about each of the works of Monet contained within the
exhibition and, most important, the relations between these works
(e.g., their thematic similarities, their arrangement within the gallery
space etc.).  So, too, is it with rock albums.  The claim that “Sgt.
Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band is a phenomenal album” should be
taken as shorthand for a bundle of judgments I have made about each
of the tracks contained within the album and the relations between
them as they are arranged on the album.  In this way, we can account
for the critical attention we bring to bear on an album without having
to posit it as an ontological entity over-and-above the songs that
comprise it.
Even if we can appropriately apply the division limitation, the descent
to megapluralism might result from deciding what kinds of things can
properly count as a work of rock music. Consider other things the rock
musician might create.  Clearly, we cannot label everything a rock
musician creates a “work of rock music.”   We might say that a work
will be a work of rock music where it has a specific causal relationship
with our appreciation of a work that is musical in nature (i.e.
something like the song, track, or performance).  
9. Conclusion
Ontologies of rock that select only one kind of thing as the musical
work generally fail to reflect the way in which we ordinarily deal with
rock music.  The solution to this problem is not to be skeptical about
higher-order ontologies but rather to adopt a pluralist ontology of rock
that recognizes the importance of rock songs, rock tracks, and rock
performances.  I have defended this pluralist position, arguing that
these three kinds of things are equally deserving of work-status, given
the substantial critical attention each receives in the rock tradition.  I
have also outlined several advantages of this approach, including its
ability to allow for cross-ontological comparisons between recorded
tracks and live performances of the same song.  In adopting a pluralist
position, we embrace a unique ontology that is distinct from ontologies
of other musical traditions and that more accurately reflects the way in
which we engage with rock music.[69]
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